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_______________ 
 
OPINION 
_______________ 
 
MCKEE, Chief Judge. 
 
Hector Duran-Pichardo petitions for review of the 
final order of his removal issued by the Board of 
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Immigration Appeals.  For the reasons that follow, we will 
deny the petition. 
 
I. 
 
Duran-Pichardo, is a native of the Dominican 
Republic and he was lawfully admitted to the United States 
as a legal permanent resident in 1981.  He was married in 
1988, and he subsequently fathered two children.
1
   
 
On July 3, 1997, Duran-Pichardo applied for 
naturalization as a United States citizen.  On May 11, 1998, 
he completed his examination under oath.
2
  Therefore the 
only thing that remained before he could become a 
naturalized citizen was taking the public oath of allegiance 
and renunciation.
3
  After he successfully completed the 
                                                 
1
 His wife became a naturalized citizen in 1998.  Because his 
two children from that marriage were born in the United 
States, they are U.S. citizens.  
 
2
 The examination under oath authorizes a designated 
examiner to take testimony pertaining to admissibility and 
citizenship and permits the examiner to make a 
recommendation regarding the applicant‘s fitness for 
naturalization.  See 8 U.S.C. §1446(b); see also, 8 U.S.C. 
§1443(a) (―Such examination shall be limited to inquiry 
concerning the applicant‘s residence, physical presence in the 
United States, good moral character, understanding of and 
attachment to the fundamental principles of the Constitution 
of the United States, ability to read, write, and speak English, 
and other qualifications to become a naturalized citizen as 
required by law, and shall be uniform throughout the United 
States.‖). 
 
3
 Congress commanded that an alien must take a specific oath 
before the Attorney General or appropriate court prior to 
becoming a naturalized citizen.   See 8 U.S.C. § 1448.  The 
oath includes a pledge to:  ―support the Constitution of the 
United States; (2) . . . renounce . . . all allegiance . . .  to any 
foreign. . . sovereignty . . . (3). . . support and defend the 
Constitution and the laws of the United States . . . [and] (4) to 
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examination, Duran-Pichardo was given a document that 
stated: ―[the] INS will notify you later of the final decision 
on your application.‖ 
  
When the ―final decision‖ did not come in the mail, 
Duran-Pichardo made repeated calls to the agency in an 
attempt to be scheduled to take the Oath.  According to 
Duran-Pichardo, he subsequently learned that part of his 
naturalization file had been mislabeled and he was 
ultimately advised that all or part of his naturalization file 
had been lost.  Although we cannot be sure of exactly what 
happened to his file, it is clear that Duran-Pichardo never 
took the Oath. 
    
On March 17, 2008, nearly ten years after Duran-
Pichardo satisfactorily completed his naturalization 
examination under oath, he pled guilty to conspiracy to 
distribute and possess narcotics and possession with intent 
to distribute cocaine and was sentenced to 51 months‘ 
imprisonment.  
 
On October 26, 2008, the Government instituted 
removal proceedings against Duran-Pichardo on the grounds 
that he was an alien who had been convicted of a controlled 
substance violation under 8 U.S.C. §1227(a)(2)(B)(i) and an 
aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. §1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).  
Although he did not challenge the convictions and conceded 
that they would otherwise make him eligible for removal, he 
argued that he was not removable because his 1997 
naturalization application had been finalized.  He also 
argued that, to the extent his naturalization application had 
not been finalized, he should not be removed because the 
Government‘s own actions precluded him from taking the 
Oath and thereby prevented his naturalization and 
citizenship.
 4 
                                                                                                             
bear . . . allegiance to the [United States] . . .‖  (the ―Oath‖).  
Id.   
 
4  See 8 C.F.R. 335.3(a) (―A decision to grant or deny the 
application shall be made at the time of the initial 
examination or within 120-days after the date of the initial 
examination of the applicant for naturalization . . ..‖).   
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While removal proceedings were pending, Duran-
Pichardo requested a hearing on his naturalization 
application and attached evidence that his naturalization file 
had been mislabeled and/or lost.  On September 3, 2009, the 
Government moved to consolidate two naturalization files 
under Duran-Pichardo‘s name—conceding, at a minimum, 
that Duran-Pichardo‘s primary naturalization file did not 
contain all pertinent information.
5
   
 
On July 31, 2009, despite the pending removal 
proceedings, the Government formally denied Duran-
Pichardo‘s application for naturalization which had been 
pending since 1997.
6
  The Government based that denial on 
his 2008 convictions, and concluded that those convictions 
made him ineligible for naturalization.  His appeal of that 
decision was denied.  
 
Thereafter, the Immigration Judge presiding over the 
removal proceedings found Duran-Pichardo removable 
under 8 U.S.C. §§1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) and (B)(i), and ordered 
him removed from the United States to the Dominican 
Republic.  The BIA dismissed Duran-Pichardo‘s appeal of 
that order because it found that it lacked jurisdiction to 
                                                                                                             
 
5
 The Government did not, however, concede that any 
administrative error was responsible for its failure to schedule 
Duran-Pichardo for a ceremony to take the Oath.  
 
6
 The Government‘s denial of Duran-Pichardo‘s 
naturalization application subsequent to the initiation of 
removal proceedings exceeded its statutory authority.  See 8 
U.S.C. §1429 (―[N]o application for naturalization shall be 
considered by the Attorney General if there is pending against 
the applicant a removal proceeding pursuant to a warrant of 
arrest issued under the provisions of this chapter or any other 
Act.‖).  Though troubling, it does not alter the outcome of this 
matter.  As discussed more fully throughout this opinion, 
because Duran-Pichardo had not taken the Oath prior to his 
convictions, he remains an alien subject to removability.   The 
subsequent and ill-conceived denial of his naturalization 
application does not affect his removal. 
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decide the issues he raised.   Nevertheless, the BIA stated 
that the Government could remove Duran-Pichardo even 
though the delay in scheduling him to take the Oath resulted 
from the Government‘s mishandling of his file. This Petition 
for Review followed.  
 
II. 
 
On appeal, Duran-Pichardo argues -with some 
justification - that absent the Government‘s own error, he 
would have taken the Oath and become a naturalized citizen 
before his convictions and thus would no longer be 
removable.  He therefore claims that he: (i) obtained a 
protected liberty interest in the grant of his naturalization 
application; (ii) is entitled to an order granting his 
naturalization application; and/or (iii) is entitled to a nunc 
pro tunc review of his naturalization application so that it 
may be finalized (and presumably granted) without 
consideration of convictions that occurred after he 
completed the naturalization process. 
 
Though we generally lack jurisdiction to review an 
aggravated felon‘s final order of removal, we have 
jurisdiction to review Duran-Pichardo‘s challenge to the 
agency‘s denial of his citizenship claim because there are no 
factual issues and we retain the authority to determine our 
own jurisdiction.  See 8 U.S.C. §1252(a)(2)(C); see also, 
Brandao v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 654 F.3d 427, 428 (3d 
Cir. 2011) (―[W]e do have jurisdiction to determine our 
jurisdiction, particularly in cases such as this where the 
petitioner claims to be a national of the United States, and 
no material issues of fact are presented.‖).  Section 
1252(a)(2)(D) also provides that we retain jurisdiction to 
consider constitutional questions and Duran-Pichardo argues 
that he has unconstitutionally been deprived of a protected 
liberty interest without due process of law.  Because we 
address a purely legal question, our review of the agency‘s 
rejection of Duran-Pichardo‘s due process claim is plenary.   
 
To become a naturalized citizen of the United States, 
Duran-Pichardo was required to: (i) maintain five years‘ 
lawful permanent residence, physical presence in the United 
States for at least half of that time, and continuous residence 
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from the date of application until admission to citizenship; 
(ii) submit an application; (iii) pass a background check; (iv) 
pass a test on United States history and government and 
establish his proficiency in communicating in English; (v) 
be examined under oath by an immigration official; and (vi) 
publicly swear allegiance to the United States and renounce 
allegiance to other sovereigns before the Attorney General 
or a competent court. See 8 U.S.C. §§1423(a); 1427(a); 
1445(a); 1446(a) & (b); 1448(a).   
 
It is undisputed that Duran-Pichardo did everything 
that was required for naturalization except take the Oath. He 
claims that that omission should not defeat his claim to 
citizenship because he was verbally informed that his 
application for naturalization had been approved and the 
date for the Oath ceremony was forthcoming.  Duran-
Pichardo, however, concedes that he never actually took the 
Oath as prescribed by statute.  
 
Because Duran-Pichardo never took the Oath, he 
never became a citizen and he remained subject to removal.  
Congress requires that an alien publicly take the Oath before 
the Attorney General (or his/her designee) as a condition of 
naturalization.  The statutory language is clear and 
unambiguous.  Therefore, Duran-Pichardo was still subject to 
removal even though he completed all of the other 
prerequisites to citizenship.  See e.g., Okafor v. Attorney 
General, 456 F.3d 531, 534 (5th Cir. 2006) (alien who 
signed document containing oath of renunciation and 
allegiance required of all applicants for naturalization, but 
who did not take oath in public ceremony, had not met 
requirements for becoming naturalized citizen); Tovar-
Alvarez v. Attorney General, 427 F.3d 1350, 1353 (11th Cir. 
2005) (same).   
 
Duran-Pichardo claims, nevertheless, that his 
satisfactory completion of all of the other requirements for 
naturalization created a liberty interest in citizenship that 
cannot be undermined by something that was the result of the 
Government‘s own delay in administering the Oath.7  The 
                                                 
7  Though Duran-Pichardo‘s argument is analogous to an 
equitable estoppel claim, he contends that he is not making an 
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Government asserts that Duran-Pichardo could not acquire 
any cognizable liberty interest until he had satisfied all of the 
conditions for becoming a citizen, including taking the 
statutorily-mandated oath.  
 
The relevant naturalization regulation, 8 C.F.R. 
335.3(a) provides: 
 
USCIS
[8]
 shall grant the [naturalization] 
application if the applicant has complied with 
                                                                                                             
estoppel argument. But see Appellant‘s Brief, pp. 17-18 
(―Had the INS fulfilled its statutory duties in 1998, Mr. Duran 
would have been a citizen for nearly ten years at the time of 
his arrest, and the secondary (and much worse) punishment of 
deportation would not have been an option. . . . [T]his Court 
should now order the USCIS to fulfill that requirement, and 
grant Mr. Duran his citizenship.‖).  Nevertheless, his claim is 
so similar to an assertion of estoppel that prudence requires 
that we treat that claim as though it rested on an alleged 
estoppel. 
  
 Despite the Government‘s purported negligence in 
finalizing Duran-Pichardo‘s petition for citizenship, these 
circumstances do not give rise to an estoppel. To establish 
equitable estoppel here, Duran-Pichardo must show: (i) a 
misrepresentation; (ii) upon which he reasonably relied; (iii) 
to his detriment; and (iv) affirmative misconduct.  See Mudric 
v. Att’y General of the U.S., 469 F.3d 94, 99 (3d Cir. 2006).  
We have previously held that delay in processing a 
naturalization application does not give rise to an estoppel 
claim.  See id. (―[M]ere delay does not constitute ‗affirmative 
misconduct‘ on the part of the Government.‖). 
 
8
 The Attorney General has delegated his statutory authority 
to naturalize immigrants to the United States Customs and 
Immigration Service (―USCIS‖).  See 8 U.S.C. §1421; see 
also, 8 C.F.R. §310.1.  On March 1, 2003, Congress 
transferred the functions of the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service to the Bureau of Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (―ICE‖) and USCIS of the United 
States Department of Homeland Security (―DHS‖).  Zheng v. 
Gonzales, 422 F.3d 98, 103 n. 2 (3d Cir. 2005). 
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all requirements for naturalization under this 
chapter.  A decision to grant or deny the 
application shall be made at the time of the 
initial examination or within 120-days after the 
date of the initial examination of the applicant 
for naturalization under §335.2.  The applicant 
shall be notified that the application has been 
granted or denied and, if the application has 
been granted, of the procedures to be followed 
for the administration of the oath of allegiance 
pursuant to part 337 of this chapter. 
 Id.; see also 8 U.S.C. §1446(d) (―The employee designated 
to conduct any such examination shall make a determination 
as to whether the application should be granted or denied, 
with reasons therefor.‖) (emphasis added).  If an applicant 
for naturalization is not notified of a decision within 120 
days of his/her examination under oath, s/he can apply to the 
appropriate United States District Court for a hearing on the 
naturalization application pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §1447(b).
9
 
 
 Thus, USCIS was only required to act on his 
naturalization application within 120 days from the date of 
his examination under oath, it was clearly not required to 
grant the application before Duran-Pichardo satisfied the 
statutory prerequisites to citizenship – nor could it have 
done so without violating the very statute that establishes the 
procedure for becoming a naturalized citizen.  Moreover, it 
is clear that the USCIS retained the discretion to deny 
Duran-Pichardo‘s application for naturalization until he took 
the Oath that is mandated by Congress. Thus, Duran-
                                                                                                             
 
9
 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b) provides:  
If there is a failure to make a determination 
under section 1446 of this title before the end of 
the 120-day period after the date on which the 
examination is conducted under such section, 
the applicant may apply to the United States 
district court for the district in which the 
applicant resides for a hearing on the matter. 
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Pichardo could not have obtained any recognizable interest 
in the grant of his naturalization application without taking 
that Oath. 
 
 Though the parties focus much of their arguments on 
whether Duran-Pichardo‘s application was actually granted or 
should have been granted, that is not the question before us.  
We need only determine if Duran-Pichardo remained subject 
to removal until he took the Oath.  Since Congress requires 
that an alien publicly take the Oath before the Attorney 
General (or his/her designee) as a condition of naturalization, 
that question is not difficult to answer.  The statutory 
language is clear and unambiguous. Duran-Pichardo was still 
subject to removal even though he completed all of the other 
prerequisites to citizenship.  See e.g., Okafor v. Attorney 
General, 456 F.3d 531, 534 (5th Cir. 2006) (alien who signed 
document containing oath of renunciation and allegiance 
required of all applicants for naturalization, but who did not 
take oath in public ceremony, had not met requirements for 
becoming naturalized citizen); Tovar-Alvarez v. Attorney 
General, 427 F.3d 1350, 1353 (11th Cir. 2005) (same); Conn. 
Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 465 (1981) (―A 
constitutional entitlement cannot be created-as if by estoppel-
merely because a wholly and expressly discretionary 
[government] privilege has been granted generously in the 
past.‖ (internal quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis in 
original)); Mudric  v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 469 F.3d 94, 99 
(3d Cir. 2006) (―[T]he various discretionary privileges and 
benefits conferred on aliens by our federal immigration laws 
do not vest in aliens a constitutional right to have their 
immigration matters adjudicated in the most expeditious 
manner possible. . . .  [The alien] simply had no due process 
entitlement to the wholly discretionary benefits of which he . . 
. [was] allegedly deprived, much less a constitutional right to 
have them doled out as quickly as he desired.‖). 
 
   The facts, however, remain that the Government 
failed to act on Duran-Pichardo‘s application within 120 
days of his naturalization examination, and Duran-Pichardo 
failed to apply to the District Court for a hearing on the 
matter.  Having failed to invoke the very statutory and 
regulatory scheme that Congress enacted to address this type 
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of delay, Duran-Pichardo can not now assert that he was 
deprived due process of law. 
 
 Now, Duran-Pichardo has no remedy because he has 
committed an aggravated felony and removal proceedings 
have been initiated against him.  See 8. U.S.C. § 1429 
(―[N]o person shall be naturalized against whom there is 
outstanding a final finding of deportability pursuant to a 
warrant of arrest issued under the provisions of this chapter 
or any other Act; and no application for naturalization shall 
be considered by the Attorney General if there is pending 
against the applicant a removal proceeding pursuant to a 
warrant of arrest issued under the provisions of this chapter 
or any other Act . . ..‖).  
 
  ―Removal proceedings quite simply have priority 
over naturalization applications. . . . [I]t would be ‗odd if the 
Attorney General and district courts were barred from 
considering naturalization applications while removal 
proceedings are pending, yet the BIA and IJs—who have no 
jurisdiction over such applications in any case—were not.‘‖ 
Zegrean v. Att’y Gen. of U.S, 602 F.3d 273, 274-5 (3d Cir. 
2010) (quoting Perriello v. Napolitano, 579 F.3d 135, 142 
(2d Cir. 2009)); But cf. Gonzalez v. Sec’y of Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec., 678 F.3d 254, 259-61 (2012) (preserving 
the availability of limited judicial review of naturalization 
decisions during removal proceedings in circumstances not 
presented by this case). 
 
 Duran-Pichardo argues that he is entitled to nunc pro 
tunc review of his naturalization application.  ―Nunc pro 
tunc” consideration ―permits acts to be done after the time 
they should have been done with a retroactive effect.‖  
Barden v. Keohane, 921 F.2d 476, 478 n.2 (3d Cir. 1990).  
Essentially, Duran-Pichardo wants us to order the agency to 
review his application as if he was not an aggravated felon 
and, thus, still eligible for citizenship.   
 
 However, we clearly lack the authority to provide 
nunc pro tunc relief here.  Equitable relief is unavailable if it 
would require agency review of an alien‘s naturalization 
application while that alien is the subject of an outstanding 
finding of deportability or a pending removal proceeding.  
 12 
See 8 U.S.C. §1429; see also, Cheruku v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 
662 F.3d 198, 209 (3d Cir. 2011) (―[A] court may not award 
equitable relief in contravention of the expressed intent of 
Congress.‖) (internal citations omitted); Ajlani v. Chertoff, 
545 F.3d 229, 240-1 (2d Cir. 2008) (―[A]n alien cannot 
secure naturalization from either the district court or the 
Attorney General while removal proceedings are 
pending….‖).   
 
 We realize that it may appear that we are turning the 
proverbial ―blind eye‖ toward the Government‘s lapse in 
handling Duran-Pichardo‘s application for naturalization.  
However, it must be remembered that, but for his status as 
an aggravated felon, and the criminal convictions that gave 
rise to that status, he would still be eligible for 
naturalization.  We can undo neither his crimes nor his 
convictions and therefore, as we have already explained, 
Duran-Pichardo is removable and ineligible for the relief he 
is requesting. 
 
 For the reasons set forth above, the petition for review 
will be denied.  
 
  
